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NOTES
THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ATTRIBUTING
CORPORATE INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP TO
CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
UNDER ESTATE TAX SECTION
2042
The business use of life insurance provides flexibility for corporate
and tax planners of closely held corporations.' The estate tax treatment
of life insurance proceeds paid on the life of an insured decedent who
was a controlling shareholder, however, has come within the long-
standing controversy surrounding section 2042,2 the estate tax statute
governing life insurance. In the last decade the Internal Revenue Serv-
1. See generaly, e.g., L. KLINGER, ESTATE AND FINANCE PLANNING FOR THE CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATION (1980); S. MONROE, BUSINESS INSURANCE & ESTATE PLANNING AFTER THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 (1977); E. WHITE & H. CHASMAN, BUSINESS INSURANCE (4th ed.
1974); Jacobs, Back to Basics-Post TRA-76 Stock Interest Terminations in Closely-Ield Corpo-
rations, 36 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 3 (1978); MCGAFFEY, Planning the Client's Life Insurance
Program, 35 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1295 (1977).
2. I.R.C. § 2042 provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR.-To the extent of the amount receivable by the
executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES.-To the extent of the amount receivable
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with
respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership,
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. For purposes of the
preceeding sentence, the term "incident of ownership" includes a reversionary interest
(whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of
law) only if the value .f such reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of the
policy immediately before the death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term
reversionary interest includes a possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy,
may return to the decedent or his estate or may be subject to a power of disposition by
him. The value of a reversionary interest at any time shall be determined (without re-
gard to the fact of the decedent's death) by usual methods of valuation, including the use
of tables of mortality and actuarial principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the
Secretary. In determining the value of a possibility that the policy or proceeds thereof
may be subject to a power of disposition by the decedent, such possibility shall be valued
as if it were a possibility that such policy or proceeds may return to the decedent or his
estate.
All references are to the 1954 Code, as amended, unless otherwise stated.
The confusing treatment accorded life insurance under the estate tax code has been well docu-
mented. See, e.g., 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §§ 17.03-.04
(1959); Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance." A Suggested Solution to the Uncertain Cost ofDying, 55
HARV. L. REV. 226, 227 (1941); Swihart, Federal Taxation of Lfe Insurance Wealth, 37 IND. L.J.
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ice promulgated several revenue rulings and a new regulation to deal
specifically with life insurance policies owned by corporations insuring
principal stockholders.3  Whether this regulation is appropriate de-
serves consideration because insurance proceeds included in a dece-
dent's estate can dramatically increase the taxable estate.
Carefully tailored insurance arrangements provide for a smooth
transition of leadership when a corporate officer dies. For example, a
buy-sell agreement, financed through life insurance, guarantees reten-
tion of ownership and control of the business in the hands of the sur-
viving stockholders while simultaneously reimbursing decedent's estate
for the value of his stock in an equitable, prompt manner. A split
dollar plan accomplishes a variety of goals, such as funding a cross-
purchase plan and providing direct estate liquidity when proceeds are
payable to the estate.6 The maintenance of a key-man life insurance
policy improves the short and long term financial position of the close
corporation by strengthening its credit standing and providing for addi-
tional cash flow when the officer dies.7 Because insurance plays such a
167, 177 (1962); Note, Incidents of Ownership Testsfor Inclusion of Life Insurance Proceeds in
Decedents' Gross Estate, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 370 (1971).
3. The Treasury Department promulgated Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6), the regulation at
issue in this Note, in 1974. Revenue Rulings most relevant to a consideration of this regulation
include Rev. Rul. 79-46, 1979-1 C.B. 330; Rev. Rul. 76-274, 1976-2 C.B. 278; Rev. Rul. 72-167,
1972-1 C.B. 307; and Rev. Rul. 71-463, 1971-2 C.B. 333.
4. See generally S. MONROE, supra note 1, at 1B-3B; E. WHITE & H. CHASMAN, supra note
I, at 271-80. Too often, the controlling interest passes to "inexperienced or disinterested heirs."
Id Thus, planning for continuity of aggressive management becomes vital.
5. The two basic types of buy-sell agreements are cross purchase agreements and stock re-
demption agreements. Under a cross purchase plan, surviving stockholders purchase the deceased
stockholder's shares in the corporation with funding provided by each stockholder acquiring in-
surance on the life of the other. Under a stock redemption agreement, the corporation itself ac-
quires the insurance and buys the shares of the deceased stockholder. See E. WHITE & H.
CHASMAN, supra note 1, at 309.
For a general discussion of the factors influencing the choice of agreement and the tax ramifica-
tions see L. KLINGER, supra note 1, at 48-51; S. MONROE, supra note I at 3B-13B; Jacobs, supra
note 1.
6. The term split-dollar plan covers various kinds of arrangements that allow a person to
purchase insurance coverage by splitting the premium cost with another individual or entity, often
an employer (corporation)-employee arrangement. The corporation usually is entitled to the cash
surrender value and the remainder of the proceeds are payable to a beneficiary named by the
insured. See generally E. WHITE & H. CHASMAN, supra note 1, at 485-507. See also Estate of
Dimen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 198 (1979); Estate of Levy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 873 (1978);
Estate of Schwager v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 781 (1975); Genshaft v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 282
(1975).
7. A key-man policy is owned by and payable to the employer corporation to indemnify the
employer against the loss of an influential employee or director. It also serves to bolster the confi-
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crucial role in corporate planning, Treasury Regulation section
20.2042-1 (c)(6), the regulation at issue, should not be deemed appropri-
ate without substantial congressional and judicial support.8
The Estate Tax Code specifically provides for life insurance taxa-
tion.9 The current statute divides insurance into policies payable to the
insured decedent's estate and policies payable to other beneficiaries. 10
The Code includes in a decedent's estate the proceeds of policies paya-
ble to other beneficiaries only if the decedent retained incidents of own-
ership.t Although Congress has not substantially modified the statute
since 1954, the regulations have undergone extensive alteration.' 2 The
addition of section 20.2042-1(c)(6) in 1974'1 greatly expanded the scope
of the former regulations as applied to insurance policies held by close
corporations. Attribution of corporate incidents of ownership may now
apply to sole and controlling stockholders.' 4
dence of the corporation's creditors. See L. KLINGER, supra note 1, at 99-117; E. WHITE & H.
CHASMAN, supra note 1, at 441-59. For a practical approach to insurance for lawyers see S.
MONROE. supra note 1; Wright, Life Insurance and Its Use in Estate Planning, 23 OKLA. L. REV.
125 (1970).
8. This Note does not contend that Congress could not tax life insurance more broadly, but
rather that in light of legislative history and judicial interpretations inadequate support exists to
fully accept the scope of Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c)(6). Treasury Regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to statutory authority are entitled to deference and will be upheld if they represent a reason-
able implementation of congressional intent. See I.R.C. § 7805. See also United States v.
Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973); Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501
(1948). Regulations may be held invalid, however, if unreasonable, see Bingler v. Johnson, 394
U.S. 741 (1969), contrary to the statute, see M.E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 267 (1938),
or beyond the scope of a statute, see Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
9. See I.R.C. § 2042, note 2 supra.
10. See id § 2042(1)-(2), note 2 supra.
11. I.R.C. § 2042(2), note 2 supra. Full inclusion of the proceeds results to the extent the
policies are payable to the decedent's estate. I.R.C. § 2042(1), note 2 supra.
Section 2042 is not an exclusive statute, however. Life insurance may be included in a dece-
dent's estate, for example, under either section 2033 or 2035. See J. LEwis, THE ESTATE TAX 237
(4th ed. 1979); C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & T. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 340-
41 (3d ed. 1974). Additionally, if the decedent had powers over a policy in trust, the proceeds may
be includable under either of two sections, 2036 or 2038. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(4)(1958).
12. See notes 17-18, 26, 29, 31 infra and accompanying text.
13. T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277.
14. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1974) provides:
In the case of economic benefits of a life insurance policy on the decedent's life that are
reserved to a corporation of which the decedent is the sole or controlling stockholder, the
corporation's incidents of ownership will not be attributed to the decedent through his
stock ownership to the extent the proceeds of the policy are payable to the corporation.
Any proceeds payable to a third party for a valid business purpose, such as in satisfac-
tion of a business debt of the corporation, so that the net worth of the corporation is
increased by the amount of such proceeds, shall be deemed to be payable to the corpora-
Number 2] 433
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This Note initially reviews the history of Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 20.2042-1(c)(6) and considers the impact of the new regulations.
The Note then analyzes the issue of the appropriateness of the regula-
tions in light of the interpretation of the term of art "incidents of own-
ership" and the proportion of the proceeds that may be included in the
controlling shareholder's estate.' 5
I. HISTORY OF TREASURY REGULATION SECTION 20.2042-1(c)(6)
Section 2042 has a rather complex history that involves three major
changes.6 Initially, the 1918 Revenue Act included in the decedent's
tion for purposes of the preceding sentence. See § 20.2031-2(f) for a rule providing that
the proceeds of certain life insurance policies shall be considered in determining the
value of the decedent's stock. Except as hereinafter provided with respect to a group-
term life insurance policy, if any part of the proceeds of the policy are not payable to or
for the benefit of the corporation, and thus are not taken into account in valuing the
decedent's stock holdings in the corporation for purposes of section 203 1. any incidents
of ownership held by the corporation as to that part of the proceeds will be attributed to
the decedent through his stock ownership where the decedent is the sole or controlling
stockholder. Thus, for example, if the decedent is the controlling stockholder in a corpo-
ration, and the corporation owns a life insurance policy on his life, the proceeds of which
are payable to the decedent's spouse, the incidents of ownership held by the corporation
will be attributed to the decedent through his stock ownership and the proceeds will be
included in his gross estate under section 2042. If in this example the policy proceeds
had been payable 40 percent to the decedent's spouse and 60 percent to the corporation,
only 40 percent of the proceeds would be included in decedent's gross estate under sec-
tion 2042. For purposes of this subparagraph, the decedent will not be deemed to be the
controlling stockholder of a corporation unless at the time of his death, he owned stock
possessing more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of the corporation.
Solely for purposes of the preceding sentence, a decedent shall be considered to be the
owner of only the stock with respect to which legal title was held, at the time of his death,
by (i) the decedent (or his agent or nominee); (ii) the decedent and another person jointly
(but only the proportionate number of shares which corresponds to the portion of the
total consideration which is considered to be furnished by the decedent for purposes of
section 2040 and the regulations thereunder); and (iii) by a trustee of a voting trust (to
the extent of the decedent's beneficial interest therein) or any other trust with respect to
which the decedent was treated as an owner under subpart E, part I, subchapter J, chap-
ter 1 of the Code immediately prior to his death. In the case of group-term life insur-
ance, as defined in paragraph (b)(1)(i) and (iii) of § 1.79-1 of this chapter (Income Tax
Regulations), the power to surrender or cancel a policy held by a corporation shall not be
attributed to any decedent through his stock ownership. (Reg. § 20.2042-I).
"Controlling" or "principal" shareholder in this Note refers only to the definition of control
used in Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6), ie., a shareholder who owns more than 50% of the corporate
voting stock. As perceived by the Supreme Court, the term is not a "[word] of art with a fixed and
ascertainable meaning." United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 138 n.13 (1972); see note 107 infra
and accompanying text.
15. This Note concerns only issues under section 2042(2)-the estate tax consequences of life
insurance proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than the decedent's estate.
16. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1098 (1918), Revenue Act of 1942,
Pub. L. No. 753, 56 Stat. 944 (1942); Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, 68A Stat. 387 (1954).
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gross estate only "policies taken out" by the decedent on his own life. 17
The first regulations, attempting to define the inclusion criterion, ruled
that proceeds were taxable if the insured paid the insurance premi-
ur s. 18
The Supreme Court gave substance to the statutory phrase "incidents
of ownership" more than a decade after the promulgation of the first
regulations applicable to the forerunner of section 2042.19 Chase Na-
tional Bank v. United States involved a constitutional challenge to the
estate taxation of life insurance policies. 20  The Court found that life
insurance proceeds payable to other beneficiaries could be taxed as part
of the decedent's estate because the insured possessed incidents of own-
ership until death.2 In sustaining the constitutionality of the statute
the Court reasoned that the taxpayer's death resulted in a shift of eco-
nomic benefits. 2
2
In the same year the Supreme Court decided Chase National Bank
the "incidents of ownership" language appeared in Treasury Regula-
tions, although the Service did not consider the phrase to be a determi-
For a more thorough discussion of the history of the statute see J. LEWIS, supra note 11, at 237; C.
LoWNDEs, R. KRAMER & T. McCoRD, supra note 11, at 321-28; 2 J. MERTENS, supra note 2, at
§ 17; Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 226-46. See also Note, Federal Estate Ta=; Application ofthe
Section 2042 Incidents of Ownership Concept to the Insured Fiduciary's Estate, 60 IOWA L. REV.
1319, 1321-27 (1975); Note, A Decedent's Powers as Trustee ofa Life Insurance Trust-Taxable
'ncidents of Ownership", 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 95, 96-106.
17. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18 § 402(0, 40 Stat. 1098 (1918) (current version at I.R.C.
§ 2042). Up to $40,000 was exempted for proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than decedent's
estate.
18. Treas. Reg. § 37, art. 32 (1919), quoted in Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 230.
19. See Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
20. Id at 336-37. The taxpayer had named his wife as beneficiary on several policies, but a
tax on policies transferred away during life arguably was unconstitutional because unapportioned,
thus violating article 1, sections 2 and 9 of the Constitution, which require direct taxes-as op-
posed to taxes upon a transfer-to be apportioned. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 9. The Court refuted
this argument: "A power in the decedent to surrender and cancel the policies, to pledge them as
security for loans and the power to dispose of them and their proceeds for his own benefit during
his life ... is by no means the least substantial of the legal incidents of ownership." Id at 335.
21. Id at 337-38.
22. The Court further explained the basis for its decision:
Termination of the power of control at the time of death inures to the benefit of him who
owns the property subject to the power and thus brings about, at death, the completion of
that shifting of the economic benefits of property which is the real subject of the tax
Id at 338.
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native factor for inclusion at that time.' The Treasury fluctuated
during the next decade between treating "incidents of ownership" in
conjunction with, as an alternative to, or in place of the payment of
premiums test.24 Thus, the Treasury's later interpretation of the phrase
"incidents of ownership" to require inclusion of life insurance proceeds
in a decedent's estate represented a shift from the Supreme Court's use
of "incidents of ownership" as merely a rationale for inclusion.25
The Revenue Act of 1942 eliminated the "policies taken out" lan-
guage. Thereafter, either "payment of premiums" or "possession of in-
cidents of ownership" caused inclusion under the statute.26
Unfortunately, no congressional explanation accompanied the statu-
tory elevation of the phrase "incidents of ownership."27 The House
and Senate committee reports did, however, list examples of "incidents
of ownership" in an attempt to clarify the phrase. The language of
these reports provided a foundation for the current regulations. The
examples of "incidents of ownership" included the "right of the insured
or his estate to the economic benefit of the insurance" and the "power
to change the beneficiary reserved to a corporation of which the dece-
dent is sole stockholder."28
23. The 1929 regulations were approved March 23, 1929. See Treas. Reg. § 70, art. 27 (1929),
quoted in Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 232. See generally Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 233-34.
24. Compare Treas. Reg. § 70, art. 27 (1929) ("incidents of ownership" language in conjunc-
tion with payment of premiums test) and Treas. Reg. § 80, art. 25 (1934), quoted in Schlesinger,
supra note 2, at 234 (changed "retained" incidents of ownership to "possessed" and made it an
alternative test) with Treas. Reg. § 80, art. 25 (1941), T.D. 5032, 1941 C.B. 427, 427-28 (incidents
of ownership adopted as exclusive test).
25. See generally C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & T. McCoRD, supra note 11, at 323-24.
26. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, 56 Stat. 944 (1942). The $40,000 exemption was
also eliminated. Id This is the first time the statute itself made the "incidents of ownership"
language applicable.
There were challenges to the inclusion of proceeds of policies on which the decedent had paid
premiums but retained no incidents of ownership. See generally Swihart, supra note 2, at 178.
United States v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960), upheld the validity of this test on
grounds that the beneficiary's right to the proceeds does not mature until death of the insured. Id
at 198-99.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 2333,77th Cong., 2d Sess. 162-63 (1942), reprintedin 1942-2 C.B. 372,
491. The Report gives only a blunt guideline: "This provision is intended to prevent avoidance of
the estate tax and should be construed in accordance with this objective." Id
Generally, the motivation for the 1942 statutory change was assumed to be an attempt to lessen
the confusion already shrouding the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Co., 355 F.2d 7, 10 (Ist Cir. 1966) (Congress trying to introduce "some certitude in a landscape of
shifting sands"); Estate of Levy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 873 (1978) (an effort to eliminate
problems of interpretation).
28. Both the House and Senate Reports specifically stated:
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In 1954 Congress amended the statute again. Congress retained the
"incidents of ownership" test as the sole criterion for determining
whether the proceeds from life insurance, payable to others, should be
taxable to a decedent's estate.29 Some courts and commentators have
concluded from the relatively meager legislative history that Congress
intended section 2042 to parallel the Code's treatment of other property
interests and powers.3 °
There is no specific enumeration of incidents of ownership, the possession of which at
death forms the basis for inclusion of insurance proceeds in the gross estate, as it is
impossible to include an exhaustive list. Examples of such incidents are the right of the
insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the insurance, the power to change the
beneficiary, the power to surrender or cancel the policy, the power to assign it, the power
to revoke an assignment, the power to pledge the policy for a loan, or the power to obtain
from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy. Incidents of ownership
are not confined to those possessed by the decedent in a technical legal sense. For exam-
ple, a power to change the beneficiary reserved to a corporation of which the decedent is
sole stockholder is an incident of ownership in the decedent.
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 491; S. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 676-77 (emphasis added).
29. See Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, 68A Stat. 387 (1954) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 2042(2)). Elimination of the payment of premiums test primarily motivated Congress in taking
this action. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4757; note 30 infra. The statute itself never defined "incidents of ownership."
30. See Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973) ("by enact-
ing § 2042 Congress intended to give life insurance policies estate tax treatment roughly
equivalent to that accorded other types of property"); Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d
699, 702 (2d Cir. 1972) (strong inference that Congress intended that § 2042 "should operate to
give insurance policies estate tax treatment that roughly parallels the treatment that is given to
other types of property by § 2036. . .§ 2038 . . . and § 2041"). But Vf. Estate of Connelly v.
United States, 551 F.2d 545, 551 (3d Cir. 1977) ("more logical that Congress intended to equate
incidents of ownership with the right to economic benefits of the policy"); 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
995, 1002-03 (1973) (Skifer reliance on legislative history unjustified).
The rationale for the parallel treatment approach springs from the explanation of the Senate
Finance Committee for eliminating the payment of premiums test from the 1954 enactment of
section 2042: "No other property is subject to estate taxation where the decedent initially
purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights to the property and to discrimi-
nate against life insurance in this regard is not justified." S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
124, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621,4757. Accord, H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4117-18. The
same Committee strengthened the inference of the correctness of this approach by emphasizing
that the addition to the statute of the 5% reversionary interest rule was necessary "[t]o place life
insurance policies in an analogous position to other property." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 124, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4757.
It has been stated that Congress has the power to tax life insurance even more broadly but
instead chose to limit itself when it adopted the 1954 version of section 2042. See United States v.
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1966). Cf. United States v. Manufacturers
Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194, 198 (1960) (any taxable event that could fairly be considered a 'transfer'
"is clearly constitutional without apportionment"). The Rhode Island Hospital court apparently
found some intent to make section 2042 analogous to other sections of the Code:
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Congress again failed to explain why it retained the "incidents of
ownership" test as the sole criterion for inclusion. In 1958 the Treasury
Department promulgated regulations to interpret the phrase.3' These
regulations, however, merely adopted the language of the committee
reports that accompanied the Revenue Act of 1942, with one significant
change. The committee reports listed "the right. . . to the economic
benefits of the policy" as an example of an incident of ownership; the
regulations elevated this "example" to a general definitional phrase.32
What (Congress) was attempting to reach in Section 2042 and some other sections was
thepower to dispose of property, the same power that the Supreme Court recognized as a
basis for exercise of the tax instrument in Chase National Bank v. United States ....
Power can be and is exercised by one possessed of less than complete legal and equitable
title. The very phrase "incidents of ownership" connotes something partial, minor and
even fractional in its scope. It speaks more of possibility than probability.
Id at 10.
The basic theory of the estate tax is to tax the privilege of transferring property at death, and
other transfers that are in substance testamentary substitutes. See Lowndes,,4n Introduction to the
FederalEstate and Gift Taxes, 44 N.C. L. REv. 1, 4 (1965). Whether life insurance is in substance
a testamentary transfer then becomes a relevant question. When the premium payments test was
eliminated in 1954, see note 23 supra and accompanying text, the minority of the House Ways and
Means Committee objected on grounds that life insurance is inherently testamentary in nature.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4025, 4608. Although the sentiment is to a certain degree still present, the view that life insurance
has sufficient indices of investment property to be treated as other property under the estate tax
prevails. Compare C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & T. McCoRD, supra note 11, at 326-28 (life insur-
ance should not be taxed like other property because unlike other property decedent can "pass
along unlimited amounts of property. . . without encountering the estate tax") with Swihart,
supra note 2, at 179 n.78 ("[any] investment [property] is used to secure a return and to form a
savings").
31. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (1958) T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, provided in pertinent part:
Receivable by other beneficiaries: (1) Section 2042 requires the inclusion in the gross
estate of the proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life not receivable by or for the
benefit of the estate if the decedent possessed at the date of his death any of the incidents
of ownership in the policy, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other
person ....
(2) for purposes of this paragraph, the term "incidents of ownership" is not limited in
its meaning to ownership -of the policy in the technical legal sense. Generaly speaking,
the term has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic benfts of the
policy. Thus, it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the
policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to
obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc. Similarly,
the term includes a power to change the beneficiary reserved to a corporation of which
the decedent is sole stockholder.
Id (emphasis added). Current regulation § 20.2042-1(c) remains substantially unchanged but the
last sentence in the above quote has been deleted because of the addition of Treas. Reg. § 2042-
l(c)(6). See Treas. Reg. § 2042-1(c) (1974).
32. Compare the listing of examples of incidents of ownership in the 1942 committee reports,
supra note 28, with the italicized language in § 20.2042-I(c)(2), supra note 31. Because of the
distinction, § 2042(2) arguably applies only to powers exercisable for the insured's benefit. See
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/3
Number 2] ESTATE TAX SECTION 2042 439
These regulations developed the "sole stockholder" rule: A sole
stockholder's estate must include the full amount of any proceeds paid
to a corporation or other beneficiary when the corporation retains any
incidents of ownership in a policy on the shareholder's life.33 No tax-
payer challenges to the validity of this rule occurred34 until the Service
announced Revenue Ruling 71-463. 35 In that Ruling a corporation was
owner and beneficiary of a life insurance policy insuring a seventy five
percent controlling stockholder. Among other ownership rights, the
corporation reserved the right to change beneficiaries, assign the policy,
Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1972); Note, Federal Estate Tax-
"Incidents of Ownership" in Group Life Insurance, .4 Phrase Searchingfor Definition, 52 N.C. L.
REv. 671, 678-79 (1974). See generally Estate of Connelly v. United States, 551 F.2d 545, 547-49
& 549 n.7 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Chase Nat'1 Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929) (right to
economic benefits of the policy); Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1960) (same);
Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913
(1959) (same).
33. See note 31 supra.
34. See, e.g., Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959).
In a few early cases courts did not indicate that corporate control could be a basis for inclusion,
even though the decedent was controlling shareholder and the corporation owned several policies
on the insured decedent's life. See generally Newell v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1933)
(question of valuation of stock when insurance proceeds payable to corporation); In re Kennedy, 4
B.T.A. 330 (1926) (same). The courts did not face the issue of corporate attribution, however,
because the phrase "policies taken out by the decedent" determined inclusion at the time and
presented much confusion in itself. See text accompanying notes 17 and 18 supra.
The litigation that did occur involving business insurance actually related to the line of cases
that developed the concept of an incident of ownership. An early case under the incidents of
ownership test allowed an exception that taxpayers in later cases attempted to seize upon. In
Estate of Doerken v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 809 (1942), the corporation insured decedent's life,
paid premiums, credited itself with the cash surrender value, kept possession of the policies, and
received the entire amount of proceeds at decedent's death. The policy form, however, reserved to
decedent the right to change beneficiaries, to surrender, and to cancel the policy, though the dece-
dent never exercised these powers. The court held the proceeds excludable upon the theory that
intent of the parties controls over the wording of the policy. That is, the decedent insured is
merely a "nominal owner" when it clearly appears he intended to transfer all rights and retain no
incidents of ownership.
Several later cases dealt with the intent argument when the decedent shareholder attempted to
disclaim any incidents of ownership. Rejecting the argument upon the facts, these courts instead
focused upon the "in conjunction with any other person" language of section 2042(2). See Estate
of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965) (taxpayer failed to factually prove he
intended to divest himself of all incidents of ownership); Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D.
Me. 1959) (even assuming decedent could not have changed beneficiary without consent of corpo-
ration they could have done so acting together). In Kearns v. United States, 399 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl.
1968), the court drew upon the Supreme Court decision of Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380
U.S. 678 (1965), to refute the "nominal owner" theory by suggesting the rationale is obsolete
under the 1954 Code. 4ccord, Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp. 1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
35. 1971-2 C.B. 333.
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and surrender or cancel the policy. The Ruling maintained that the
"sole stockholder" language of the regulation constituted an example
rather than an exclusion. Thus, inclusion results when the decedent
has power to exercise incidents of ownership.36 The Ruling held the
regulation "applicable in circumstances where the insured decedent
could exercise voting control of the corporation. 37
The rationale given as underlying this premise paralleled the argu-
ments the Commissioner would make in a landmark case the following
year.38  The Service reasoned that because decedent, as controlling
shareholder, had power to dissolve the corporation, he effectively could
cancel or distribute the policy.39 The decedent's power to maintain
himself as president and to elect other officers allowed him the advan-
tages of incidents of ownership "without the necessity of acquiring the
policy itself."4 °
The Service cited no supporting cases in its Ruling.4 ' Commentators
extensively criticized the Ruling and began to scrutinize the sole stock-
holder rule more carefully.42 A review of this criticism is relevant to an
analysis of the present regulations not only as a historical development
but also because the present regulations still attribute incidents of own-
36. Id at 334.
37. Id at 333.
38. The same emphasis on de facto powers supported the Commissioner's arguments in
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972). See notes 100-03, 107-08 infra and accompanying
text.
39. 1971-2 C.B. 333.
40. Id at 334. The Service did rule that because the proceeds were includable in the dece-
dent's estate, they should not be reflected in the value of his stock interest for inclusion under
section 2033. Id.
41. Implicit support for the Ruling arguably existed. In Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d
461 (Ct. Cl. 1969), the Commissioner argued that the decedent, who was president and 50% share-
holder of the corporation, could combine with another shareholder to terminate a group life insur-
ance policy. The court rejected that argument as exceeding the thrust of section 2042, but added
in dictum that a different decision might result upon convincing evidence of such control. Id at
471. Cf. Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp. 1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (regulation as applied to sole
stockholder rule cited in support of holding that decedent's veto power over trust that owned
policy on decedent's life constituted incident of ownership because decedent could act in conjunc-
tion with others to change beneficiary). For a discussion that the economic benefit rationale un-
derlying these cases does not apply to the type of situation in a ruling like 71-463 see Howard,
Corporate Control as an Incident of Ownership Under Section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code,
13 ARIZ. L. REv. 619, 632-34 (1971).
42. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 41; Osborn, Corporate-Owned L/fe Insurance.- Recent Devel-
opments in Estate Planning, 32 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 293 (1974); Simmons, How to Handle the
IRS's Attack on Corporate-OwnedLfe Insurance, 36 J. TAX. 142 (1972); Walker, What Will Effect
of Proposed Regulations on Corporate Owned i/fe Insurance Be?, 39 J. TAx. 206 (1973).
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ership to a controlling stockholder to the extent that proceeds from a
corporate owned life insurance policy are payable to a personal benefi-
ciary.43
One major objection was that the Ruling violated the tax principle
recognizing a wholly owned corporation as a distinct, separate entity.4
4
An income tax case, decided in the same year that the Service proposed
section 20.2042-1(c)(2), a5 illustrated that a controlled corporation is not
merely a majority stockholder's alter ego. In Casale v. Commissioner
the Tax Court maintained that the taxpayer's ninety-eight percent
owned corporation "was no more than a conduit. '46 Thus, premiums
paid by the corporation on a key-man insurance policy amounted to a
distribution of a dividend and must be included in the taxpayer's gross
income.47 The Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court and declared the
"controlled" corporation a separate entity.48
Commentators argued that in the absence of any definite congres-
sional support Revenue Ruling 71-463 deviated too much from ac-
cepted notions of a corporation's identity as a separate entity.49 As one
commentator stated, the Ruling "must certainly have marked a record
tremor on the Richter scale of the estate planning world."5 The "sole
stockholder rule" itself was merely an example-a statement only of
what the House and Senate Committees in 1942 assumed the law to
be.5t
43. See note 14 supra.
44. See generally authorities cited in note 42 supra. One commentator delineated three fac-
tors of attribution that the ruling failed to account for: (1) Estate and gift tax law rarely recognizes
attribution principles judicially nor does it statutorily sanction them; (2) though attribution is
commonly recognized in the income tax area, the "normal rule is [still] to respect the corporate
entity"; (3) Congress generally defines "control" when attribution is to be recognized. See How-
ard, supra note 41, at 625-26.
The Estate Tax Code does statutorily recognize attribution currently where stock has been
placed in trust but the grantor retains voting control. See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2), note 104 infra.
45. The Regulations were initially published in the Federal Register (21 Fed. Reg. 7850) on
October 16, 1956. See T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432.
46. Casale v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 1020, 1025 (1956), rev'd, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
47. Id at 1027.
48. 247 F.2d at 445. The court emphasized: "We have been cited to no case or legislative
provision which supports the proposition that the entity of a corporation which is actively engaged
in a commercial enterprise may be disregarded for tax purposes merely because it is wholly owned
or controlled by a single person." Id
49. See generally authorities cited in note 42.
50. Walker, supra note 42, at 206.
51. See id This "assumption" provided the foundation for what became an expanded, in-
flexible rule with Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1974). Other criticisms levied against the ruling
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The criticism was quite effective, apparently, because the Service
withdrew Revenue Ruling 71-463 the following year, before taxpayers
could challenge the Ruling in the courts. 2 In 1974 the Treasury De-
partment promulgated Treasury Regulation section 20.2042-1(c)(6) 5 3
which provides that corporate-owned life insurance payable for valid
business purposes to either the corporation or a third party will not be
included in a decedent's estate. The regulation also precludes attribut-
ing the corporation's incidents of ownership to decedent because of his
stock ownership 5 4 To the extent that proceeds from a policy owned by
the corporation are payable to a personal beneficiary, however, the reg-
included: (I) The ruling gave no explanation for the income tax consequences regarding the basis
of the stock; (2) the ruling provided inadequate guidelines for valuing the stock itself: (3) the
ruling ignored the legal obligations directors and controlling shareholders owed creditors and
minority shareholders. See Howard, supra note 41; Osborn, supra note 42; Simmons, Final Regs
on Corporate-OwnedLife Insurance. Grealy ImproyedBut Still Questionable, 41 J. TAX. 66 (1974);
Walker, supra note 42.
Significantly, Congress declined to incorporate the ruling into the Internal Revenue Code in
1954 when the Code was revised. The "incidents of ownership" test became the sole criterion for
inclusion, but no change in the interpretation of the phrase was suggested, with the exception of
the reversionary interest. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text. It has also been judi-
cially recognized that neither the 1954 revision of the Code nor Treas. Regs. § 20.2042-1(c) was
intended to change the concepts already evolved to explain the term "incidents of ownership."
See Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 1965). See also Howard, supra
note 41, at 62 n.12; Osborn, supra note 42, at 298.
Though possession of any of the specific examples set out in § 20.2042-I (c)(2) generally results
in inclusion, see, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965) (right to change benefi-
ciary or assign the policy); Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1968) (right to pledge
policy for a loan); Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853
(1950) (right to surrender or cancel policy), the concept has been broadened since the Court in
Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929), equated incidents of ownership with
substantial control over the policy. See generally Note, Federal Estate Tax: Application ofthe
Section 2042 Incidents of Ownership Concept to the Insured Fiduciary's Estate, 60 IowA L. REv.
1319, 1325 (1975); Note, supra note 32, at 676.
The new regulations under section 2042 and the controversy regarding the insured fiduciary are
only part of the Service's push toward an expanded definition of the term "incidents of owner-
ship." Despite the language of United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir.
1966), see note 30 supra, some rights held over insurance policies have been found too insignifi-
cant to constitute incidents of ownership. See, e.g., Landorfv. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl.
1969) (right to cancel or force conversion of group policy by terminating employment causes no
inclusion), acq. Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 C.B. 307; Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 307
(1979) (option to take assignment of policy if decedent's employer decides to stop paying premi-
ums causes no inclusion); Bowers v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 911, 917 (1955) (right to receive divi-
dends on policy causes no inclusion).
52. See Rev. Rul. 72-167, 1972-1 C.B. 307. The Service simply announced that new regula-
tions were under consideration. Id
53. T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277.
54. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1974), note 14 supra.
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ulation attributes the incidents of ownership to the insured decedent
who is a controlling shareholder.5 1
The Service reportedly has not changed its position. In the Treasury
Decision announcing the new amendment the Service stated that sec-
tion 2042 treats a controlling stockholder the same as a "sole stock-
holder." The Service allows exclusion only because it is unnecessary to
include proceeds payable to a corporation in decedent-insured's es-
tate. 6
II. IMPACT OF CASE LAW
Few cases have been litigated under the new regulations and only
one directly challenged the regulations. In Estate of Huntsman v. Com-
missioner57 the decedent was the president and sole owner of two cor-
porations that owned key-man insurance policies on his life. The issue
was not whether -section 20.2042-1(c)(6) and section 20.2031-2(f), a co-
ordinated valuation section, should apply, but how to value decedent's
stock for inclusion in his estate 8.5  The Commissioner argued the
proper approach is to ascertain the value of the stock without the insur-
ance proceeds, and then simply add the value of the proceeds.5 9 The
only change from existing law effected by the regulation, according to
55. Id Note that a parallel amendment was made to § 20.2031-2(f) providing that the por-
tion of the proceeds excludable from decedent's estate shall be considered in determining the
value of decedent's stock at his death. Paragraph (f) of § 20.2031-2 was amended to read as fol-
lows:
§ 20.2031-2 Valuation of stocks and bonds.
(f) Where selling prices or bid and asked prices are unavailable. If the provisions of
paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this section are inapplicable because actual sale prices and
bona fide bid and asked prices are lacking, then the fair market value is to be determined
by taking the following factors into consideration:
(1) In the case of corporate or other bonds, the soundness of the security, the interest
yield, the date of maturity, and other relevant factors; and
(2) In the case of shares of stock, the company's net worth, prospective earning
power and dividend-paying capacity, and other relevant factors.
Some of the "other relevant factors" referred to in subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this
paragraph are: ...In addition to the relevant factors described above, consideration
shall also be given to nonoperating assets, including proceeds of life insurance policies
payable to or for the benefit of the company, to the extent such non-operating assets have
not been taken into account in the determination of net worth, prospective earning
power and dividend-earning capacity. ...
56. See T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 377.
57. 66 T.C. 861 (1976), acq. 1977-1 C.B. I.
58. 66 T.C. at 862.
59. Id at 872. The Commissioner's conclusion rested on the assumption that former regula-
tions were consistent with legislative purpose and approved by the courts. Id
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the Commissioner, was to prorate life insurance proceeds over the
shares of stock when the insured owns a majority, but not all, of the
stock.' ° The taxpayer responded that such proceeds are simply another
corporate asset to be considered in determining valuation. The court
agreed with the taxpayer that the regulation required a practical ap-
proach to valuation. The policies must be considered, but the total
amount of the proceeds need not be added per se.61
Estate of Clarke"2 also addressed the issue of valuation under the
Regulation. The Clarke court, purporting to follow Huntsman, simply
added the approximate face value of the proceeds to the decedent's
shares, and then discounted the entire amount for nonmarketability. 63
In Estate of Levy v. Commissioner 4 the decedent's estate squarely
challenged the validity of the regulations. Decedent owned 80.4 per-
cent of Levy Brothers, Inc. voting stock at the time of his death but had
never been the sole stockholder. Levy Brothers owned two split-dollar
insurance policies on decedent's life, reserving the rights to change the
beneficiary, to assign or borrow against the cash policy, and to modify
the policies. Mrs. Levy was designated beneficiary, and the beneficiary
could not be changed without her consent.65
The decedent's estate first alleged that the new regulation was incon-
sistent with the incidents of ownership test in 2042(2).66 The language
of the 1942 committee reports, essentially adopted by the 1958 regula-
tions, in effect precluded attribution of corporate incidents of owner-
ship to any stockholder other than a sole stockholder; if Congress
intended a broader inclusion it would have stated so. 7 The Commis-
60. Id at 873-74.
61. Id at 874. The court made a significant perception as to the practical effect the proceeds
would have upon the value of the corporation: "In determining the price a willing buyer would
pay, it is obvious that life insurance proceeds must be given 'consideration' but it is equally obvi-
ous that the price paid by a willing buyer would not necessarily be increased by the amount of the
life insurance proceeds." Id at 874-75.
62. 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 76,328 (1976).
63. The court reached a value of $4,040 per share for the class of stock primarily in dispute.
The proceeds from the life insurance policy received by the corporation approximately equaled
$40,000. The court then added a value of $40 per share to the stock held by decedent to reach a
total value of $4,080 per share---discounted by 20 percent--to equal $3,520 per share. Id at 1478-
79.
64. 70 T.C. 873 (1978).
65. Id at 875. The decedent possessed no incidents of ownership in the policies other than
those attributed through his stock ownership.
66. Id at 878.
67. Id at 879-80. See also note 28 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:431
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sioner characterized the regulations as an amplification, rather than a
departure, from prior law.68
The court held that the "sole stockholder rule" was only an illustra-
tion adopted by the earlier regulation and was not intended to be an
exclusive rule.69 No meaningful distinction existed between a sole
stockholder and the decedent because the decedent "had the power to
elect corporate officers who would be amenable to decedent's wishes as
to the exercise of the incidents of ownership held by the corporation."70
The court cited no authorities for its belief that the original regula-
tions under 2042(2) were not limited in application to sole sharehold-
ers. In fact, only Revenue Ruling 71-463 could have provided direct
authority for the court's conclusion, but the Service had withdrawn that
ruling because of harsh criticism.71 Congress' intent to attribute corpo-
rate incidents of ownership to stockholders with less than one hundred
percent stock ownership was less clear to others.
The estate, citing Casale v. Commissioner,72 also argued that applica-
tion of the sole stockholder example to a controlling stockholder vio-
lated the separate entity concept of a corporation.73 Casale failed to
persuade this court, however, because the Second Circuit decided that
case under a different Code section.74
The estate further contended that any incidents of ownership held by
decedent's corporation were restricted by a fiduciary capacity.75 In dis-
missing this argument the court noted that the estate had not proven
68. 70 T.C. at 878.
69. Id at 880. The court bluntly stated:
In either situation the stockholder possesses the power over the activities of the corpo-
ration so as to effect the disposition of the insurance proceeds. Clearly, Congress did not
intend to attribute corporate incidents of ownership to a sole stockholder while excluding
a stockholder owning 99 percent of the voting stock of a corporation or 80.4 percent in
the instant case.
Id The court later detailed what "power" the decedent could exercise through the corporation:
Although the parties did not stipulate the specific terms of the policies, it is apparent that
the corporation, by the exercise of its rights in the policies, had the power to realize all or
at least the greater portion of the proceeds of the policies prior to decedent's death and
thus prevent decedent's widow from receiving much of the insurance proceeds.
Id at 881.
70. Id
71. See notes 42-52 supra and accompanying text.
72. 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957). See notes 46-48 supra.
73. 70 T.C. at 880.
74. Id
75. Id The estate relied upon Estate of Freuhauf v. Commissioner in which the Sixth Circuit
rejected a broad rule of inclusion, which stated that merely because a decedent could exercise the
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the decedent to be a corporate officer or director. Thus, if decedent acts
in a fiduciary capacity, he must be acting as a shareholder, because
incidents of ownership are attributable to him through his stock hold-
ings. In this capacity, the court stated, "it is difficult to see how the
corporation or minority shareholders could be injured by exercising the
incidents of ownership to defeat the widow. 7
6
The most recent case decided under the regulations illustrates the
difficulties of attempting to avoid attribution of incidents of ownership.
In Estate of Dimen v. Commissioner77 decedent's corporation owned a
split-dollar life insurance policy on his life. An agreement between the
corporation and decedent's daughter, the policy's beneficiary, required
written consent of the daughter before the corporation could change
the beneficiary or the manner of payment. The agreement further pro-
vided that the corporation would refrain from exercising other inci-
dents of ownership without obtaining her consent or giving her the
right to purchase the policy. Either party could cancel the arrangement
upon thirty days notice, and the beneficiary had the option to purchase
the policy within that period of time.7" The estate analogized the
daughter to an irrevocably designated beneficiary whose rights and re-
quests must, by the supplemental agreement, be respected by the corpo-
ration.79
The Commissioner argued that decedent's corporation retained sub-
stantial incidents of ownership despite the supplemental agreement.80
The court, agreeing with the Commissioner, focused on a broad defini-
tion of "incidents of ownership" as including something fractional in
nature.81 The court emphasized that the regulations required inclusion
in decedent's estate of the proceeds payable to the daughter if decedent
possessed any incidents of ownership in the policy, exercisable alone or
incidents of ownership only in a fiduciary capacity, such capacity was no bar to inclusion. See
Estate of Freuhauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
76. 70 T.C. at 882. But see notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text.
77. 72 T.C. 198 (1979). The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision. No. 80-4025
(2d Cir., May 15, 1980).
78. 72 T.C. at 200-02. The beneficiary shared the cost of premium payments with the corpo-
ration. Id at 202.
79. Id at 205.
80. Id at 203. The corporation still possessed the right to surrender or cancel the policy, the
right to assign the policy or borrow against it, and the right to change the beneficiary as exercisa-
ble in conjunction with Muriel Dimen. Id at 205.
81. Id at 204 (citing United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 10 (1966)).
The Rhode Island Hospital definition is quoted in note 30 supra.
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82in conjunction with any other person.
The decedent's estate argued that the policy fell within the scope of
Revenue Ruling 76-274, 3 in which a similar agreement gave a third
party power to change the beneficiary and exercise settlement options.
The Service ruled that section 2042 did not require inclusion in dece-
dent's estate of the proceeds because the corporate owner's powers were
restricted by agreement with the third party.8 4 The Dimen court distin-
guished decedent's case from the Ruling on grounds that the agreement
at issue in the ruling clearly prohibited the corporation from taking any
action that would endanger the interest of the "subowner" or the pay-
ment of proceeds in excess of the cash surrender value. The agreement
in Dimen provided the decedent's corporation with much greater
power; thus, section 2042 required inclusion of the proceeds in dece-
dent's estate.85
Only in a footnote did the court acknowledge Revenue Ruling 79-
46,86 which asserts that the right to purchase the policy, held by the
daughter in Dimen, is an incident of ownership. The court found the
remaining incidents of ownership held by the corporation to be sub-
stantial enough to cause inclusion of the proceeds.87
III. ARE THE REGULATIONS APPROPRIATE?
The criticisms leveled at Revenue Ruling 71-463 apply as well to the
present regulations. The one case that considered the validity of the
regulations cited only legislative reports of the 1942 Act to support ex-
pansion of the sole stockholder example, even though the Service had
acquiesced to critics who considered the same reports inadequate to
82. 72 T.C. at 203-04. The court actually seems to have fully conceptualized the decedent
and his corporation as one entity, as illustrated in its elaboration of the incidents of ownership
possessed by the corporation:
It makes no difference whether the decedent had the power to initiate the exercise of a
power or whether his consent is simply required. In this sense, a negative or veto power
of the decedent over any of the incidents of ownership is sufficient to require inclusion of
the policy proceeds in the gross estate.
Id. at 204.
83. Id at 205 (citing Rev. Rul. 76-274, 1976-2 C.B. 278).
84. Rev. Rul. 76-274, 1976-2 C.B. 278.
85. 72 T.C. at 198.
86. 1979-1 C.B. 303.
87. 72 T.C. at 205 n.1l.
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sustain Revenue Ruling 71-463.11
Although the few cases decided under the regulations involved sole
stockholders or stockholders with a considerable percentage of con-
trol, 9 the regulations themselves are quite broad. They apply to con-
trolling stockholders with interests greater than fifty percent. The
closer the actual control is to fifty percent and the greater the number
of minority shareholders, especially if unrelated, the greater the need
for critical analysis.90
In Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner9 the Fifth Circuit espoused a
new approach to section 2042(2). The court found that the benefici-
ary's right to alter the time and manner of enjoyment of life insurance
proceeds "affords its holder the kind of control over the proceeds that
will make it an 'incident of ownership' within meaning of § 2042(2). ' '92
It reached this conclusion by evaluating the estate tax scheme under
sections 2036 and 2038. 91 The court inferred from the examples given
in section 2042's legislative history9 4 that Congress intended to tax "the
value of life insurance proceeds over which the insured at death still
possessed a substantial degree of control."95 The court, coupling that
intent with the congressional intent to give life insurance estate tax
88. Revenue Ruling 71-463 was withdrawn even before it was challenged in the courts. See
note 52 supra and accompanying text.
89. In both Dimen and Huntsman the decedent owned all voting stock. See 72 T.C. at 199;
66 T.C. at 862. In Clarke and Levy decedents owned 55% and 80.4%, respectively, of the voting
stock. See 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 76,328, at 1456; 70 T.C. at 873.
90. At least one commentator foresees the possibility that the I.R.S. will attempt to expand
the incidents of ownership attribution rules to officers and directors as a result of their positions in
a corporation that owns split-dollar policies on the lives of the officers and directors, even though
the officers and directors are not controlling shareholders. See Rollyson, Keyman/Split-Dollar
Life Insurance: Attribution to Employee's Estate, 62 A.B.A.J. 801, 803 (1976).
91. 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
92. Id at 1097. The group term life insurance policy that covered the decedent as an em-
ployee of Humble Oil & Refining Company included an optional settlement provision. By exer-
cising various options the insured employee could extend or diminish the payment period to a
beneficiary. Id at 1093-95.
93. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit discussed the Supreme Court decisions of United States v.
O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966), and Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953). Lober held that a
decedent who retains the right to alter the time of enjoyment by trust beneficiaries holds a § 2038
power to "alter, amend, revoke or terminate." 346 U.S. at 336-37. See I.R.C. § 2038. Similarly,
O'Malley held that a power over the time and manner of a beneficiary's enjoyment amounted to a
right to "designate" who will enjoy certain trust property within § 2036. 383 U.S. at 632-33. See
I.R.C. § 2036.
94. See note 28 supra.
95. 474 F.2d at 1095. See United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 10 (lst
Cir. 1966) (cited in Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092, 1095 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973)).
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treatment similar to that of other property under the Code,96 reasoned
that identifying an incident of ownership depends on what constitutes
"substantial control" under sections 2036 and 2038. 97 An anomaly
would result if a power sufficient to cause inclusion under 2036 and
2038 was insufficient to constitute an incident of ownership under sec-
tion 2042.9'
If Lumpkin's approach to identifying an incident of ownership is cor-
rect,99 then the "substantial control" sought to be taxed by section
20.2042-1(c)(6) theoretically should be tested against sections 2036 and
2038 to determine whether the same power would cause inclusion
under those sections. The United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Byrum proscribed attribution of certain powers per se to vot-
ing control."° The Court firmly rejected the argument that the major-
ity shareholder who had transferred voting stock into a trust retained
the power to designate possession or enjoyment under section 2036 be-
cause of his de facto power to regulate the flow of corporate divi-
dends.'' The Supreme Court specifically found that inclusion under
section 2036(a)(2) results only from a legally enforceable right and not
from de facto control; Byrum's right to influence corporate directors, as
a majority shareholder, was not legally enforceable.0' As a fiduciary,
the majority shareholder may not "[promote] his personal interests at
the expense of corporate interests. . . ; directors also have a fiduciary
duty to promote the interests of the corporation."'' 03
96. 474 F.2d at 1095 & n.9 (citing Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.
1972)). The extent to which Congress actually intended section 2042 to parallel other sections of
the Code has not been settled. See note 30 supra.
97. 474 F.2d at 1095-96.
98. Id at 1097. The "only significant distinction" between sections 2036 and 2038, and sec-
tion 2042 recognized by the court is that under the latter section the decedent need not have
retained any power, inclusion results from possession of an incident of ownership under sectidn
2042. Id
Although the exact statutory language of section 2038 apparently makes the section applicable
to a power merely possessed and not necessarily retained in some manner, see I.R.C. § 2038, that
language has been interpreted in a more limited manner. See Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner,
468 F.2d 699, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1972).
99. The Commissioner actually relied on the United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966)
and Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) decisions as support for arguing that the decedent
in Lumpkc'n possessed an incident of ownership. 474 F.2d at 1096.
100. 408 U.S. 125 (1972). In Byrum the taxpayer controlled 71% of the voting stock but 11
minority shareholders held voting stock as well.
101. Id at 138-44.
102. Id at 136-37.
103. Id at 137-38.
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Admittedly, Congress enacted its own view of the proper application
of section 2036,1"4 but the Court's perception of voting control is not
necessarily totally rejected.'0 5 At the very least, the regulations under
section 2042 should impose only a presumption of control and not a per
se rule.'1 6 The Byrum Court noted that deeming the shareholder to be
in "control" of a corporation is problematic.'07 The court maintained
that the concept was "too variable and imprecise to constitute the basis
per se" of taxation under section 2036(a).0 8
The argument made by the estate in Levy-that any incidents of
ownership are restricted by a fiduciary capacity-merits greater consid-
eration than given by the Tax Court.0 9 Merely to state that the corpo-
ration may exercise its incidents of ownership to defeat the widow begs
the question. The key consideration should be whether the corporation
exercised its incidents of ownership in its own best interests as a corpo-
104. I.R.C. § 2036, as amended in 1978, provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life
or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
(b) Voting Rights-
(1) In general.-For purposes of subsection (a)(1), the retention of the right to vote
(directly or indirectly) shares of stock of a controlled corporation shall be considered to
be a retention of the enjoyment of transferred property.
(2) Controlled corporation.-For purposes of paragraph (1), a corporation shall be
treated as a controlled corporation if, at any time after the transfer of the property and
during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death, the decedent owned
(with the application of section 318), or had the right (either alone or in conjunction with
any person) to vote, stock possessing at least 20 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock.
105. See generally Gaubatz, The Nontaxation ofNontestamentaryActls: Will Byrum Survive the
Tax Reform Act of 1976?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 623, 626-27 (1976).
106. See generally Simmons, supra note 42; Walker, supra note 42.
107. 408 U.S. at 138 n.13. The Court recognized that deeming a 50% or greater shareholder to
be in control of a corporation is both an overinclusive and underinclusive test. A stockholder with
such voting power may "control" the corporation "in the sense that he may elect the board of
directors, [b]ut ... would not control. . . certain corporate transactions such as mergers and
sales of assets." Id Conversely, corporate variables such as "size of the corporation, the number
of shareholders, and the concentration. . . of ownership" may effectively insure a stockholder
with considerably less voting stock the right to elect the board of directors. Id
108. Id
109. See Estate of Levy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 873, 880 (1978); note 75 supra and accom-
panying text.
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rate entity or solely in the best interests of the controlling shareholder.
The Levy court, considering the stock controlled by decedent and the
regulations, ignored the same economic and fiduciary restraints that the
Supreme Court recognized in Byrum.1t° Every corporate action that
benefits or might benefit the corporation should not be attributed en-
tirely to the controlling shareholder, whose personal motives may differ
entirely from corporate motives. 11
110. See notes 100-03, 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
111. It may be the minority interests who would demand, for example, that the corporation
borrow against the policy to obtain a low rate of interest where the noncorporate beneficiary is a
relative of the majority shareholder. Yet the majority shareholder cannot ignore the wishes of the
minority because of his fiduciary duty to promote the corporate interest. When the controlling
shareholder exercises his vote, the result is not necessarily a "fraud on the minority" or "oppres-
sion of the minority" or "unfair" to the minority. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATxONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 477 (2d ed. 1970) and authorities
cited therein. Though admittedly the precise scope of the controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty
is difficult to ascertain and still developing, the trend is toward an expanded duty-"a comprehen-
sive rule of good faith and inherent fairness" that may be stringently applied in the case of a close
corporation. See F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 508-19 (1975); id at 98-
100 (Supp. 1978). See also United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 137 n.l 1 (1972).
The proper approach to finding an incident of ownership and the weight to be accorded fiduci-
ary constraints on a decedent remain unsettled under another regulation of section 2042-Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-(1)(c)(4). The issue concerns the includability of insurance proceeds in the estate
of a decedent insured who was a trustee over a trust containing the policies on his own life. In
Estate of Freuhauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970), the Sixth Circuit specifically
rejected a holding that "mere possession by a decedent of any powers in the nature of incidents of
ownership in a fiduciary capacity invariably requires inclusion of the proceeds of the policies on
the decedent's life in his gross estate." Id at 86. Although recognizing the inherent constraints
imposed upon a decedent in a fiduciary capacity, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless found the proceeds
includable on alternative grounds. The trust agreement specifically authorized the decedent
trustee to surrender the policies on his life for the cash surrender value by transforming non-
income producing assets into income producing assets; thus he could exercise his "incidents of
ownership" to benefit himself as income beneficiary. Id at 86.
The Second Circuit on facts similar to Freuhauf took the approach delineated by the Lumpkin
court to determine whether a power possessed at death constitutes an incident of ownership, Ze.,
to look to whether such a power would cause inclusion under sections 2036 or 2038. See notes 92-
99 supra and accompanying text. On this basis the Second Circuit in Estate of Skiter v. Commis-
sioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972), concluded that no inclusion results under section 2042 where
the power was conveyed to the decedent long after he divested himself of all interest in the policies
and he could exercise the powers only in a fiduciary capacity, not to benefit hinself. Id at 703-04.
Critical to the court's holding was its belief that no inclusion would result under section 2038 for
such a power because the power had not been retained by the decedent, see note 98 supra; thus, no
inclusion should result under 2042. Id Accord, Estate of Hunter v. United States, 624 F.2d 833
(8th Cir. 1980).
The Fifth Circuit in Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), and Rose v.
United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), rejected the Freuhauf-Skfter analysis. Purporting to
adhere to the rationale for its decision in Lumpkin that section 2042 "roughly parallels" other
sections of the Estate Tax Code, the Rose court refused to find that section 2042 applies only to
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Furthermore, a recent case illustrates that the different treatment ac-
corded corporate and personal beneficiaries under section 20.2042-
1(c)(6) is merely an arbitrary distinction. In Estate of Smith v. Commis-
sioner the Commissioner asserted that the decedent died possessed of
an incident of ownership in life insurance policies owned by and paya-
ble to his employer." 2 The employment agreement provided that if the
company elected to stop paying premiums or to surrender or terminate
the policies, the decedent could take an assignment of the policies for
their cash value.' 13  The decedent, arguably, could thus prevent a
change of beneficiaries."I4 The Commissioner, basing the argument on
an extension of a factually similar Revenue Ruling,"I5 maintained that
the identity of the beneficiary should not be a distinguishing factor in
Smith and that inclusion of the proceeds should result. 116 The court
agreed with the Commissioner that identity of the beneficiary is not a
critical factor for inclusion." 7 The court, however, pointed out that the
Commissioner, in other instances, does distinguish situations on this
basis, specifically referring to the disparity of treatment under section
retained incidents of ownership. 511 F.2d at 263-65. According to the Rose court, Congress in-
tended to tax under section 2042 whatever is possessed at death. Thus, economic benefit is irrele-
vant so long as the decedent could exercise "substantial control" under the Lumpkin approach.
Id at 263. Terriberry is consistent with the Rose decision. See 517 F.2d at 289-90. Accord, Rev.
Rul. 76-261, 1976-2 C.B. 276.
Commentators appear equally split on the issue, thus underscoring the need for Congress to
reexamine the regulations under section 2042 and clarify the scope of incidents of ownership. See,
e.g., Baker, When WillInsurance be Included in the Trustee-Insured's Gross Estate? 47 J. TAx. 198
(1977) (Estate Tax Code generally focuses on beneficial rather than legal interests); Note, Federal
Estate Tax A4pplication of the Section 2042 Incidents of Ownershp Concept to the Insured Fiduci-
ar/s Estate, 60 IowA L. REV. 1319 (1975) (bifurcated definition of incidents of ownership pro-
posed based on assumption that treatment of insurance should exactly parallel that of other
property); Note, Estate Taxation of Life Insurance Under § 2042: Recent Decisions Dejning Inci-
dents of Ownership, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 776 (1976) (managerial powers of trustee alone
should not be taxed as incidents of ownership because Congress did not intend parallelism be-
tween section 2042 and other sections); Note, A Decedent's Powers as Trustee of a Life Insurance
Trust-Taxable "Incidents of Ownership"?, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 95 (capacity in which powers are
exercisable should be considered although section 2042 should not be paralleled to other sections).
See generalo 32 MD. L. REv. 305 (1972); 52 N.C.L. REV. 671 (1974).
112. 73 T.C. 307, 308-09 (1979).
113. Id at 308.
114. Id at 308-09.
115. See Rev. Rul. 79-46, 1979-1 C.B. 303. The critical difference is that in the ruling a dece-
dent's spouse, rather than his employer, was the designated beneficiary of the policies. See also
note 86 supra and accompanying text.
116. 73 T.C. at 309-10.
117. Id at 310.
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20.2042-1(c)(6) between corporate and personal beneficiaries."18  The
Commissioner's inconsistency certainly weakens the position taken in
the regulation.
Another aspect of the regulations that merits consideration is the
method of evaluation utilized when proceeds are payable to both the
corporation and a personal beneficiary, specifically the 60/40 example
given in the regulations." 9 It is conceivable that the method of valua-
tion could, through a "ripple effect," result in double taxation. A cor-
poration that borrows against the full cash surrender value of a policy,
invests the money wisely enough to repay the loan, and reinvests the
profits, will cause the stock value to increase in a proportionately
greater amount than the percentage of the proceeds payable to it.12 0
The same principle applies when others are induced to invest in the
corporation because of their confidence in the monetary stability of a
corporation that owns a substantial key-man policy on the life of its
most valuable employee, director, or shareholder. The value of the
stock may be increased proportionately greater than the value of the
proceeds, though only indirectly.
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of the legislative history of section 2042 demon-
strates a lack of support for the broad rule mandated by section
118. Id The court held the right to take an assignment of the policies in this case too contin-
gent to constitute an incident of ownership for purposes of section 2042. The decedent controlled
no power over the policies or over the companies decisions. Id at 312.
119. See note 14 supra.
120. Consider the following illustration:
The corporation borrows 100X, invests the money and receives a return of 200X; the loan is
then repaid. A corporation with stock previously valued at IOOX, and in which proceeds from the
policy are payable 60/40, will be valued at decedent's death as being worth 200X stock plus an
additional amount due to the consideration of 60% of the proceeds as specified in the regulation.
The decedent's estate isfuloy taxed upon the 40% of the proceeds payable to a personal beneficiary
plus the Yalue of his proportionate share of stock. For a stockholder with considerably less than a
100% interest in the corporation, Ze., a 55% controlling stockholder, there may be a greater
amount being taxed to his estate than 100% of the proceeds from the policy because of the increase
in value of the corporate stock resulting from borrowing against the policy plus the 40% taxed
under section 2042.
The decedent's estate may have great difficulty in proving the exact increase in value of the
corporate stock due to borrowing against the insurance policy, but if the conceptualization is accu-
rate it should not be denied merely because an insurmountable burden of proof is placed upon a
taxpayer.
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20.2042-1(c)(6).121 A tax court decision upheld the validity of the regu-
lation, 122 but the Circuit Courts of Appeal disagree both as to the
proper approach to identify what constitutes an "incident of owner-
ship" within section 2042 and as to the scope of the statute itself.
123
The Supreme Court's distinction between de facto powers and legally
enforceable rights in United States v. Byrum I emphasizes the need to
scrutinize attribution to controlling shareholders of corporate incidents
of ownership in insurance policies. Furthermore, the disparity of treat-
ment under the regulation based on the identity of the beneficiary lacks
consistent enforcement by the Commissioner in other instances. 125 In
sum, inadequate support exists to perfunctorily assume that the regula-
tion appropriately treats the broad range of shareholders affected.
In light of meager congressional support, 126 conflicting interpreta-
tions of legislative history, 127 the Commissioner's own position on the
relevance of identity of the beneficiary, 128 and the potential impact of
the regulations themselves, 129 the current treatment of corporate owned
life insurance policies is far from satisfactory. If such a broad rule is to
be applied, Congress should enact appropriate legislation.
Elizabeth Blaich
121. See notes 16-29 supra and accompanying text.
122. See Estate of Levy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 873 (1978); notes 64-69 supra and accompa-
nying text.
123. See notes 30, 91-98 supra and accompanying text.
124. 408 U.S. 125, 139 n.14 (1972). See notes 100-03, 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
125. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 307 (1979). See notes 112-18 supra and accom-
panying text.
126. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 30, 111 supra.
128. See notes 114-15 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 100-03, 111 supra and accompanying text.
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